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INTRODUCTION 
What do we talk about when we talk about gender imbalance on the 
bench? The first thing we do is count. Scholars, 1 pundits/ the press,3 and 
organizations4 all keep track of the number of female judges. In this Sympo-
* Paul E. and the Hon. Joanne F. Alper '72 Judiciary Studies Professor, Syracuse 
University College of Law; Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University Maxwell 
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Director, Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, 
Politics, and the Media at Syracuse University. I thank Hannah Brenner and Renee Newman 
Knake for organizing the Gender and the Legal Profession's Pipeline to Power Symposium 
for which this Article was written. I also thank the conference participants for their helpful 
comments. Portions of this Article were adapted from Keith J. Bybee, Paying Attention to 
What Judges Say: New Directions in the Study of Judicial Decision Making, 8 ANN. REv. L. 
& Soc. Sci. 69 (20 12). 
l. See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama 's Judiciary at 
Midterm: The Confirmation Drama Continues, 94 JUDICATURE 262, 263 (2011). 
2. See RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS AFTER 
THREE YEARs--WHERE Do THINGS STAND? I (2012), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2012/l/13%20nominations%20whe 
eler/0 113 _nominations_ wheeler. 
3. See Obama Picks More Females, Minorities for Judges, THEGRIO (Sept. 13, 
2011, 9:35 AM), http://thegrio.com/2011/09/13/obama-picks-more-females-minorities-for-
judges. 
4. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STILL A 
LONG WAY TO Go 1-2 (2012), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
judgescourtswomeninfedjudfactsheetaugust6.pdf. 
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sium, Linda Greenhouse provides a comprehensive accounting of women 
serving on the state and federal bench.5 Such enumerations are an essential 
starting point. Without a careful census of current judges, we cannot know 
how great the imbalance between men and women is. 
Once the data has been gathered and figures have been tabulated, we 
then argue about what the disparity between men and women in the judici-
ary means. These arguments about meaning are not freestanding. On the 
contrary, I claim in this Article that debates over the value of gender equity 
occur within the context of a broader public debate over the nature of judi-
cial decision making.6 My aim is to identify the influence of the broader 
public debate and to suggest how arguments over the meaning of gender 
imbalance on the bench should be altered as a consequence. 
My argument proceeds in four Parts. In the first Part, I explain how 
the framework of a debate may limit the range of claims and proposals dis-
cussed. 7 In the second Part, I tum to the public debate over judicial decision 
making and detail how it is organized around dueling conceptions of the 
judge as impartial arbiter and as politically motivated policymaker.8 
In the third Part, I indicate how the two prevailing conceptions of ju-
dicial decision making may constrain argumet;~.ts about gender imbalance on 
the bench.9 Calls for gender equity do not fit easily with the conventional 
conception of impartial adjudication; as a result, arguments about the im-
portance of increasing the number of female judges are often assimilated 
into the conventional conception of preference-driven policymaking. 10 Giv-
en this structure of debate, discussions about the meaning of gender imbal-
ance tend to devolve into bickering about politicized courts. 11 
In the fourth and final Part, I briefly consider how arguments about 
gender imbalance might be productively re-cast by directing gender equity 
concerns away from the broader public debate over judicial decision making 
and toward the fairness of the judicial selection process. 12 I argue that this 
strategy of re-direction will keep discussion squarely focused on gender 
disparities and will advance the cause of placing more women on the bench. 
5. Linda Greenhouse, Keynote Speech at the Spring 2012 Pipeline to Power Sym-
posium (Apr. 12, 2012), in 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1433, 1434-36. 
6. See infra Part ill. 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra Part ill. 
10. See infra Part liT. 
1 I. See infra Part ill. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STRUCTURE 
The notion that the overall structure of a debate may help determine 
the content and orientation of arguments is an old one. The work of Karl 
Marx provides an instructive example. 
In 1843, Marx identified and critiqued the constraints imposed on po-
litical discussion in liberal democracies, including the United States. 13 As 
Marx noted, Americans express their freedom by referencing the individual 
rights that protect people from the government. 14 Thus Americans under-
stand themselves as free to exercise religion and to possess property in the 
specific sense that the state is prohibited from dictating their choices about 
faith and ownership. 15 This kind of rights-based freedom is an important 
form of "political emancipation" and represents significant progression 
away from strictures enforced under European feudalism. 16 As more rights 
are extended to more people, the scope of political freedom will only con-
tinue to expand. 17 
According to Marx, the problem is that defining freedom in terms of 
individual rights makes it difficult to see that other forms of human emanci-
pation are also possible.18 In the United States, "[t]he state abolishes, after 
its fashion, the distinctions established by birth, social rank, education, oc-
cupation, when it decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation are 
non-political distinctions."19 Yet all of these distinctions retain their force 
within civil society outside the sphere of political freedom. 20 The idea of a 
communal emancipation capable of altogether transcending social divisions 
remains beyond the boundaries of public discussion, for the proliferation of 
individual rights "leads every man to see in other men, not the realization, 
but rather the limitation of his own liberty."21 Individuals are freed from the 
state and then left to relate with another only in terms of "natural necessity, 
need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egois-
tic persons.'m The liberation achieved by embracing rights is therefore both 
genuine and genuinely narrow: "[M]an was not liberated from religion; he 
received religious liberty. He was not liberated from property; he received 
the liberty to own property. He was not liberated from the egoism of busi-
13. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 26-34 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
14. Id. at40-41. 
15. Jd. at 32-33. 
16. Jd. at 35 (emphasis omitted). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 35-46. 
19. Jd. at 33. 
20. Jd. at 35. 
21. !d. at 42. 
22. !d. at 43. 
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ness; he received the liberty to engage in business.'m The only way to ex-
pand the debate over the meaning of freedom is to change its basic terms.24 
Marx embedded his critique of individual rights in a complex constel-
lation of arguments about history and human consciousness.25 It is not nec-
essary to adopt his general theories in order to accept his specific insights, 
and Marx's basic lesson about the restrictions imposed by the terms of dis-
cussion clearly has applications independent of his larger project. Indeed, 
almost a century and a half after Marx wrote, and without relying on Marx's 
broader suite of arguments, social scientists demonstrated the constraining 
power of rhetorical frameworks in a book-length study illustrating how the 
American vocabulary of individualism sharply circumscribes popular per-
ceptions of community.26 Whatever one thinks about Marx's theories of 
history, his work remains an important touchstone for understanding how a 
debate's contents are formed and confined. 
As we take our analytical cue from Marx, it is worth noting that his 
example shows that the constraints of debate are not absolute. After all, 
Marx himself was living in an age of individual rights and yet he was able 
to identify the limits of rights talk and to articulate alternative views of 
emancipation.27 Marx shows how the framework of a debate can affect ar-
guments and establish a center of gravity for thought and action.28 Follow-
ing his lead, we can say that the influence of a debate's structure is a matter 
of tendency and degree, not of precise direction and rigid categories. 
II. IMPARTIAL ARBITERS AND POLITICAL ACTORS 
With Marx's example in mind, we can begin to explore how the basic 
terms of the debate over judicial decision making shape arguments about 
gender imbalance on the bench. The first step is to identify the structure of 
the judicial decision making debate. 
As I suggested at the outset, the public discussion of judging is domi-
nated by two concepts: the judge as impartial arbiter and the judge as politi-
cally motivated policymaker. 
Judges themselves are the most vocal proponents of the concept of 
impartial decision making. 29 Judicial opinions speak entirely in terms of 
23. /d. at 45. 
24. /d. at 46. 
25. See, for example, Marx's discussion of"species-life" and "species-being." /d. at 
33-46. 
26. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM 
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2d ed. 1996). 
27. See Marx, supra note 13, at 26-46. 
28. See id. 
29. Keith J. Bybee, Paying Attention to What Judges Say: New Directions in the 
Study of Judicial Decision Making, 8 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 69,72 (2012). 
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neutral legal reasoning, and judges write as if they are relying on legal rules 
to plan and guide their actions. Judges portray themselves as moving within 
law, appealing to principle and impartial reason as standards for their deci-
sions and as grounds for criticizing those with whom they disagree.30 Judges 
rely on their specific idiom of principle and impartiality to define and de-
scribe the kind of institution that a court is.31 For example, members of the 
United States Supreme Court discuss their institutional home in synchro-
nous terms.32 They do not present the early periods of the Court as being any 
different from later periods or from the current day.33 According to the Jus-
tices, the Court's entire existence is, as Jack Miles noted in a different con-
text, "simultaneous to itself."34 The Court cannot be reduced to any particu-
lar time, place, party, or set of personalities.35 Every judicial decision, re-
gardless of when it was rendered, is available to the current members of the 
high bench, and any opinion within the canon of the Court's rulings may be 
used to comment on any other.36 Majority opinions remain eternally relevant 
as do concurrences and dissents; and the same perspective applies even to 
those decisions that have been explicitly repudiated.37 Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford,38 Plessy v. Ferguson,39 and Lochner v. New Yor/(1° all retain significant 
power as negative examples--cautionary tales that the sitting Justices regu-
larly invoke as they relate the essential characteristics of the Court. In this 
same vein, the Justices insist that issues are justiciable only where 'Judicial-
ly discoverable and manageable standards" exist,41 a requirement members 
of the Court have taken to mean that "law pronounced by the courts must be 
principled, rational, and based on reasoned distinctions."42 The Court pro-
ceeds as a court only where identifiable legal principles can be found-
principles that may be used to decide the case at hand and to create a 
framework for rationally deciding future cases.43 Without being limited to 
and guided by impartial principle, the Court enters a trackless thicket where 
30. KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL-EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: 
ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 91 (20 I 0). 
31. Bybee, supra note 29. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. JACK MILES, Goo: A BIOGRAPHY 12 (1995). 
35. Bybee, supra note 29. 
36. /d. (citing Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1329, 
1348-67 (2010)). 
37. !d. 
38. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
41. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
42. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). 
43. Bybee, supra note 29, at 73. 
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there is no clear line between proper judicial decision making and arbitrary 
judgments about policy.44 
Of course, this is not to say that Supreme Court Justices (or any other 
set of judges) always agree with one another. Yet the Justices do not typi-
cally present their differences as anything other than expressions of princi-
pled disagreement.45 The high frequency of splintered decisions does not 
mean the Court is, from the Justices' perspective, a fractious political body 
squabbling over policy.46 Arguments over law can be contentious and still 
be legal arguments: conflicting political commitments pervade constitution-
al discourse, "[a]nd yet no constitutional interpreter in the American system 
ever asserts that her answer to a constitutional question is a political as op-
posed to a legal one.'"'7 In spite of the sharply divided opinions and blister-
ing dissents, the Justices continue to portray the Court as an impartial arbiter 
resolving disputes by interpreting fixed principles of law.''48 
Judges are hardly alone in their depiction of judicial decision making 
as a neutral and reasoned enterprise. Large segments of the public see the 
courts as impartial.49 For example, thirteen separate surveys of public opin-
ion about state courts (conducted from 1989 to 2009) show a significant 
majority of Americans agreeing that state judges are fair and trustworthy. 50 
Belief in the judiciary's impartiality is found at the federal level as well.5 ' 
Polls indicate that large majorities of Americans expect federal judges to 
apply the law impartially and distrust federal judges who advance narrow 
ideological interests.52 Particular groups appear to have an especially strong 
belief in the federal courts' capacity to meet popular expectations. Many 
attorneys, for example, consider courts to be institutions of principle-SO% 
of lawyers admitted to practice in either the U.S. Supreme Court or a U.S. 
44. !d. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,559-60 (1992)). 
45. Bybee, supra note 29, at 73. 
46. !d. 
47. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION 68 (2008). 
48. Bybee, supra note 29, at 73. 
49. BYBEE, supra note 30, at 1-33. 
50. Bybee, supra note 29, at 77 (citing Deborah R. Hensler, Do We Need an Empiri-
cal Research Agenda on Judicial Independence?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 707 (1998); DAVID B. 




52. See generally James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Confirmation Politics 
and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Institutional Loyalty, Positivity Bias, and the 
A/ito Nomination, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 139 (2009); John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to 
Promote the Courts and Blunt Attacks on Judiciary, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at I 0; John M. 
Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations 
Regarding the Factors that Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181 (2001). 
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court of appeals agreed that "[ m ]ost of the time the Supreme Court 
[J]ustices closely follow the Constitution, the law, and the precedents in 
deciding cases."53 More broadly, studies have shown that the Supreme Court 
has received a good deal of public goodwill because it is generally thought 
to be an even-handed guarantor of basic democratic values for all. 54 Sixty-
four percent of those surveyed in 2006, for example, trusted the Supreme 
Court to operate in the best interests of the American people either "a great 
deal or a fair amount" of the time.55 When asked whether federal judges 
should be subject to greater political control by elected officials, more than 
two-thirds of those surveyed said no.56 
This commonly held view of judges as impartial arbiters co-exists 
with an understanding of judges as politically motivated policymakers. The 
political conception of judges has long been endorsed by scholars, begin-
ning at least as far back as the legal realists.57 Legal realism was a loose 
school of thought that developed during the early decades of the twentieth 
century. 58 Most realists doubted that court rulings were strictly derived from 
legal principles, and they insisted instead that the actual origins of judicial 
decisions were to be found in the judges' circumstances and motivations.59 
"We know, in a general way," Felix Cohen wrote in his description of the 
realists' common knowledge, "that dominant economic forces play a part in 
judicial decision, that judges usually reflect the attitudes of their own in-
come class on social questions, [and] that their views on law are molded to a 
53. Kevin T. McGuire, The Judicial Branch: Judging America's Judges, in A 
REPUBLIC DIVIDED: THE ANNENBERG DEMOCRACY PROJECT 194, 202 (2007). 
54. See generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, 
Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 
(2003); James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507 (2007); Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 52. 
55. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., PUBLIC 
UNDERSTANDING, MEDIA, AND EDUCATION 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Releases/Release_Courts20060928/ 
Courts_ Summary_ 20060928.pdf (emphasis omitted). 
56. Poll: Americans Don't Want Politicians Constraining Judges, CNN.COM (Oct. 
28, 2006, 9:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/I0/27/activist.judges. 
57. BYBEE, supra note 30, at 1-4. 
58. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); JOHN HENRY 
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); NEIL 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL 
VOYAGE (2000). 
59. Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in 
WHAT'S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES Do, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT'S AT 
STAKE 306,314 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). 
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certain extent by their past legal experience as counsel for special inter-
ests. "60 Behind judicial pronouncements about what the law is, most realists 
saw a tangled set of social pressures and political preferences at work. 
A good deal of scholarly work today is carried on in the spirit of legal 
realism.61 As I have noted, judges frequently portray judicial decision mak-
ing as a matter of legal principle and impartial reason.62 By contrast, many 
academics describe judicial decision making as a matter of preference and 
politics, an activity largely driven by the personal beliefs and policy com-
mitments that judges bring to the bench.63 That is, while judges tell us that 
everything relevant to a court's ruling is to be found in the judge's own 
words, scholars often suspect that the important reasons for a court's ruling 
have been left unsaid. Judicial attitudes,64 judicial strategies,65 and the priori-
ties of the governing regime66 are just a few of the factors scholars have 
examined when searching for the true sources of judicial action. 
Although there is no reason to believe that the public at-large is deeply 
familiar with academic research, a substantial majority of Americans none-
theless agree with the scholarly portrait of judges as political actors.67 The 
same thirteen surveys of public opinion showing significant majorities of 
Americans agreeing that state judges are fair also show large majorities of 
Americans agreeing that politics influences state judges.68 Public belief in 
political motivations is evident at the federal level as well.69 A large portion 
of the public believes that the Supreme Court operates with too little regard 
for legal principle: national surveys regularly find a near majority of re-
spondents agreeing that the Court is too mixed up in politics.70 With the 
60. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809,845 (1935). 
61. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
62. Bybee, supra note 29, at 70. 
63. BYBEE, supra note 29, at 25-32. 
64. See generally JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
65. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 
(1998). 
66. See generally Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to 
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. Sci. 
REV. 511 (2002); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON'S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL 
LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (20 11 ). 
67. Bybee, supra note 29, at 77; see also Hensler, supra note 50, at 710-13; 
ROTTMAN, supra note 50, at 1-7. 
68. Bybee, supra note 29, at 77; see also Hensler, supra note 50, at 713; ROTTMAN, 
supra note 50, at I. 
69. Bybee, supra note 29, at 77. 
70. Scheb & Lyons, supra note 52, at 181-90; Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, supra 
note 54, at 356; Gibson, supra note 54, at 512; Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 52, at 139-40; 
see also James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People 
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Court widely viewed as a political institution, the public often rates the high 
bench in ideological terms,71 and large majorities believe that the Court fa-
vors some groups more than others.72 In fact, only a little more than 7% of 
Americans think that the partisan background of judges has no influence at 
all on court decisions.73 
In view of such beliefs, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that many 
Americans express skepticism about the reasons judges give for their rul-
ings and about assertions of judicial impartiality.74 In 2005, the Maxwell 
Poll asked a representative sample of Americans whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statement: "Judges always say that their deci-
sions are based on the law and the Constitution, but in many cases judges 
are really basing their decisions on their own personal beliefs."75 A solid 
majority of respondents agreed.76 Moreover, this view was shared by ma-
jorities in a wide range of different groups: Democrats (60%) and Republi-
cans (59%); those who generally trust public officials to do the right thing 
(55%) and those who generally distrust public officials (59%); those who 
always vote (58%) and those who never vote (60%); and those who approve 
of the president ( 60%) as well as those who disapprove of the president 
(58%).77 All these groups agreed that even though judges may consistently 
invoke high legal principle, judicial decisions are often derived from more 
mundane preferences. This same question about the influence of personal 
beliefs in judging was included in panel surveys in 2005 and 2006,78 and 
again in a national survey in 201 J.19 In every instance, a significant majority 
of respondents agreed that judicial decisions are influenced by personal 
Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Ex-
periment, 58 POL. REs. Q. 187, 187 (2005). 
71. James L. Gibson, Public Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is the 
Court Invincible? 9-10 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, Working Paper, 2012), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1898485. 
72. McGuire, supra note 53, at 202. 
73. Keith J. Bybee, U.S. Public Perception of the Judiciary: Mixed Law and Poli-
tics, JURIST (Apr. 10, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/04/us-public-perception-of-the-
judiciary-mixed-law-and-politics.php. These results have been broadly confirmed at the level 
of the Supreme Court. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices 
Hits Just 44% in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at AI. 
74. Keith J. Bybee, The Two Faces of Judicial Power, in BENCH PRESS: THE 
COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA I, 3 (Keith J. Bybee ed., 2007); see also 
BYBEE, supra note 30, at 21. 
75. BYBEE, supra note 30, at 20-21. 
76. !d. at 21. 
77. !d. 
78. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Le-
gitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & Soc'y REv. 195,204,215-16 (2011). 
79. Bybee, supra note 29, at 76. 
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politics, indicating widespread doubt about the description that judges offer 
of their own decision making.80 
Ill. THE LIMITS OF THE DEBATE 
Just as the framing of freedom in terms of individual rights focuses at-
tention on governmental tyranny (while leaving issues of social hierarchy 
largely untouched), the concepts of impartial judgment and politically moti-
vated policymaking exert a powerful influence on the discussion of judicial 
decision making. 
Claims about impartial judgment are advanced in praise of judges. In-
deed, the American Bar Association considers impartial judgment to be an 
enduring ideal: 
Judges occupy the role of umpires in an adversarial system of justice; their credi-
bility turns on their neutrality. To preserve their neutrality, they must neither pre-
judge matters that come before them, nor harbor bias for or against parties in those 
matters. They must, in short, be impartial, if we are to be governed by the rule of 
law rather than judicial whim.81 
Charges of politically motivated policymaking are directed at judges 
for failing to transcend preconceptions in the way that the ideal of impartial-
ity requires.82 The basic criticism is that the judicial activist arrives in the 
courtroom with a series of objectives to be achieved.83 Litigants do not re-
ceive a hearing so much as they receive a pretense of being heard; the poli-
cymaking judge deploys law, facts, and arguments simply as ad hoc justifi-
cations for predetermined results-fig leaves of principle used to cover an 
exercise of partisan preference.84 
The opposition between ideals of impartiality and accusations of polit-
ically motivated policymaking essentially defmes the public discussion of 
judicial decision making. And many commentators worry that this dominant 
opposition is corrosive.85 The perception of politically informed decision 
making transforms judges from neutral oracles of law into biased partisans, 
80. BYBEE, supra note 30, at 20-21. 
81. ABA COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 11 
(2003), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/justiceinjeopardy.pdf. The idea 
here is not that judges must approach controversies without any preexisting beliefs about 
what the Jaw requires. ld The ideal of judicial impartiality does not ask judges to abandon 
their legal preconceptions so much as it calls upon them to not Jet preconceptions "harden 
into prejudgments," preventing them from giving fair weight to the facts, Jaw, and arguments 
that will be presented in the disputes before the courts. See Richard Briffault, Judicial Cam-
paign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 181, 211 
(2004). 
82. BYBEE, supra note 30, at 7. 
83. See id 
84. Bybee, supra note 29, at 76. 
85. See id. 
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"placing the bench on par with other policymakers" and breeding cynicism 
about the possibility of fair adjudication.86 A sign of such spreading cyni-
cism is that assertions of impartial decision making are often treated as mere 
ploys engineered to insulate policymaking judges from attack. 87 
Examples of the dueling relationship between impartiality and poli-
cymaking (as well as suggestions of this relationship's corrosive power) can 
be found in the most recent round of Supreme Court confirmation hear-
ings.88 In her opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Elena 
Kagan clearly identified herself with the image of the judge as an impartial 
arbiter.89 She began by explaining "how her experience in various settings 
taught her a set of lessons about the neutrality, principle, reason, and re-
straint of the Court."90 Kagan promised "[to] listen hard, to every party be-
fore the Court and to each of my colleagues .... [to] work hard .... [and 
to] do my best to consider every case impartially, modestly, with commit-
ment to principle, and in accordance to law."91 The Democrats on the Senate 
Committee repeatedly reinforced Kagan's pledge to exercise impartial and 
principled judgment.92 For example, Senator Patrick Leahy argued that Ka-gan "will do her best to consider every case impartially, modestly, and with 
commitment to principle and in accordance with law."93 
Republican senators roundly rejected these assurances and character-
ized Kagan as a political operative with a clear policy agenda for the high 
bench.94 Announcing his opposition to Kagan, Senator Orrin Hatch called 
her "a skilled political lawyer" and criticized her for supporting jurists that 
Hatch considered to be activists.95 "The law must control the judge; the 
judge must not control the law," Hatch argued.96 Senator Jeff Sessions 
reached the same conclusion: 
86. !d. 
87. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. 
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52 (2011). 
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91. Elena Kagan's Opening Statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, L.A. 
TIMES, June 28, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/20 10/06/elna-kagan-
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92. Bybee, supra note 88, at 150. 
93. James Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate over Supreme Court Nominee Kagan, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/03/nation/la-na-kagan-
nomination-20 I 00804. 
94. Bybee, supra note 88, at 149-50. 
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I believe she does not have the gifts and the qualities of mind or temperament that 
one must have to be a justice .... [Kagan would be] an activist, liberal progres-
sive, politically minded judge who will not be happy simply to decide cases but 
will seek to advance her causes under the guise of judging.9 
In tum, Democratic senators deflected the Republicans' criticism of 
political judging onto the conservative Justices sitting on the Supreme 
Court.98 "The rightward shift of the Court under Chief Justice Roberts is 
palpable," Senator Chuck Schumer argued.99 "In decision after decision, 
special interests are winning out over ordinary citizens. In decision after 
decision, this court bends the law to suit an ideology."100 
The fact that Republicans and Democrats consistently disagreed about 
the identity of the "true" judicial activists suggested that each camp consid-
ered impartial judicial decision making to be less a matter of neutral judg-
ment than a matter of praising preferred policy objectives. The senators did 
not seem to be doing very much in the way of genuine deliberation; instead, 
they seemed to be trying to score political points and to placate key partisan 
constituencies. As the Los Angeles Times observed in its coverage of the 
confirmation hearings, "both sides prevailed upon Kagan to be the very 
thing that both sides say they decry: a nominee with preformed views about 
the law."101 
The heated political competition at hearings diminished Kagan, push-
ing her to the periphery instead of keeping the process focused on the nomi-
nee.102 The political jockeying also raised questions about Kagan's own pro-
testations of principle and impartiality. 103 Just as the senators appeared to 
exploit the hearings in order to promote political goals, Kagan also appeared 
to use the process to advance her own interest in getting confirmed. 104 She 
was repeatedly portrayed in the press as carefully following a "script" that 
dictated her every gesture and response. 105 Her participation in the hearings 
ultimately came off as a kind of act, "a show designed to secure her eleva-
97. David M. Herszenhom, In Senate, Vote Nears on Kagan Nomination, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at Al4. 
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Approach on Supreme Court, WASH. POST, June 29, 2010, http://www.washington 
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tioning, L.A. TIMES, July l, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/20 10/juUO 1/nation/la-na-kagan-
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tion to the high bench without revealing anything about the person on 
stage. "'o6 
What implications does this sort of debate have for arguments about 
gender imbalance on the bench? Questions of gender equity may not surface 
at all in the discussion of judicial decision making (indeed, there was little 
sustained discussion of gender during Kagan's confirmation hearings, even 
though her selection would bring the number of women serving on the Su-
preme Court to a historic high107). But when questions of gender equity do 
arise, they tend to get caught up in the centrifugal forces generated by the 
clashing concepts of impartial judgment and politically motivated policy-
making. 
Since "impartiality" is the central term of praise, arguments about im-
partiality provide an obvious way to advance the case for more female judg-
es. One might argue, for instance, that female judges are more likely to 
achieve impartiality because their experience in a male-dominated profes-
sion has made them more sensitive to the ways in which gender might influ-
ence decisions-an influence that male judges detect less easily by virtue of 
their majority status. This is a plausible argument that could be developed 
into a broader case for judicial diversity embracing a wide range of under-
represented identities. Yet the effort to connect gender (or any other identi-
ty) with the more effective pursuit of impartial decision making will be 
readily countered by claims that the call for more female judges is an at-
tempt to import a political agenda into the courts. This is so because the 
debate is structured such that the sole alternative to impartial judgment is 
politically motivated policymaking. Thus, the more supporters call positive 
attention to an individual's gender, the more easily opponents may tum that 
attention in a negative direction by arguing that gender pre-commits the 
individual to particular results-and consequently renders her unable to 
make impartial decisions. 
The assimilation of gender equity arguments into the larger opposition 
between impartiality and policymaking was on clear display during Sonia 
Sotomayor's confirmation hearings. 108 The occasion for debating gender 
106. /d. 
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was created by a comment that Sotomayor had made in several different 
speeches prior to her confirmation: "I would hope that a wise Latina woman 
with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a bet-
ter conclusion than a white male who hasn't lived that life."109 As I have 
suggested, such a comment could be read as an argument about the necessi-
ty of attending to difference in order to arrive at impartial decisions. In or-
der to treat conflicting parties fairly, do we begin by ignoring gender differ-
ences? Or are we better served by first exploring the significance of these 
differences in law, society, and the life of the judge? Sotomayor attempted 
(at least initially) to take the latter approach in the hearings. In an early ex-
change with Republican Senator Jeff Sessions, Sotomayor explained that 
knowledge of identity and difference is the key to impartial judicial decision 
making: "I think the system is strengthened when judges don't assume 
they're impartial but when judges test themselves to identify when their 
emotions are driving a result or their experiences are driving a result and the 
law is not."110 Similar connections between diversity and improved judicial 
decision making were also drawn by Democratic Senators speaking in sup-
port of Sotomayor's nomination.''' 
Such arguments were met with a line of criticism linking gender to po-
litical bias. Senator Sessions, for example, plainly rejected Sotomayor's 
effort to connect gender and impartiality. 112 After reciting Sotomayor's 
"wise Latina" remark and entering the text of her speeches into the hearing 
record, 113 Senator Sessions stated that Sotomayor's nomination presented a 
clear choice between two kinds of judges: '"Do I want a judge that allows 
his or her social, political, or religious views to change the outcome? Or do 
before the Sotomayor confirmation hearings found that over one-third of Americans thought 
it was "very important" to have another woman on the Court. Jd 
109. Charlie Savage, A Judge's View of Judging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 
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grounds come to the right outcome more often than do non-diverse groups which 
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I want a judge that impartially applies the law to the facts and fairly rules on 
the merits, without bias or prejudice?"'114 Sessions made it clear that he 
thought Sotomayor belonged in the first camp. In an extended period of 
close questioning, he pushed Sotomayor to explain how her celebration of 
gender and ethnic identity could be consistent with the notion that when 
judges "put on that robe, that is a symbol that they are to put aside their per-
sonal biases and prejudices."115 Sessions brushed aside Sotomayor's claim 
that awareness of difference was the essential first step to making impartial 
decisions, and he insisted that it was impossible to square the ideal of fair 
judicial treatment with Sotomayor's "statement that you willingly accept 
that your sympathies, opinions, and prejudices may influence your decision 
making."116 Republican Senators Charles Grassley, 117 Jon Kyl, 118 and Lind-
sey Graham119 all pressed Sotomayor on the same point. They all argued that 
Sotomayor could not call attention to gender in the way she had without 
embracing the kind of personal beliefs and preferences that judges must 
ignore. 120 
Sotomayor ultimately responded by backing away from her own 
words. In praising the decision making capacities of a wise Latina, So-
tomayor said she had used a "rhetorical flourish that fell flat." 121 Her words 
were not to be taken literally. 122 Rather than making a claim about how the 
law should be interpreted and judgments rendered, Sotomayor insisted that 
her primary goal had been to motivate. 123 She gave versions of her speech 
"most often to groups of women lawyers or to groups most particularly of 
young Latino lawyers and students." 124 Her principal aim was to energize 
her audience, "to inspire them to believe that their life experiences would 
enrich the legal system, because different life experiences and backgrounds 
always do .... [and] to inspire them to believe that they could become any-
thing they wanted to become, just as I had."125 An awareness of gender and 
identity difference was not a prerequisite to impartial decision making. In-
stead, a rich variety of experiences on the bench was "good for America 
because we are the land of opportunity, and to the extent that we are pursu-
ing and showing that all groups can be lawyers and judges, that's just re-
114. /d. at 8 (quoting Senator Jeff Sessions). 
115. !d. at 69. 
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fleeting the values of our society."126 In Sotomayor's telling, her "wise Lati-
na" comment became nothing more than an anodyne restatement of the 
American Dream. 
Why did Sotomayor retreat? She was involved in a debate not only 
where assertions of judicial impartiality are countered by accusations of 
judicial policymaking, but also where assertions of impartiality are often 
interpreted as mere pretenses by the public. This is not a context in which 
novel or expansive claims about the meaning of impartiality will be easy to 
advance. If Sotomayor was not to defend her prior speeches as a new kind 
of argument about impartiality, then there was only one way to counter her 
opponents' continued accusations of political bias: she must argue that gen-
der was altogether irrelevant to the debate. When Senator Graham gave 
Sotomayor a chance to apologize for the "wise Latina" comment, she took 
it.121 
IV. A WAY FORWARD 
It is regrettable that Sotomayor did not maintain and elaborate her ini-
tial argument about the importance of gender. More broadly, it is unfortu-
nate that confirmation hearings as a whole hew to the established lines of 
debate, predictably consumed by oaths of impartiality and charges of bias, 
and largely without any fresh discussion about the determinants of good 
judicial decision making. 128 
These lamentable limits of the debate are, as I have argued, the prod-
uct of the basic terms in which the debate is organized. Of course, such lim-
its are not completely insurmountable: some arguments about gender equity 
on the bench were articulated during the Sotomayor hearings and the nomi-
nee was confirmed. Yet, if the limits of debate are not insuperable obstacles, 
they nonetheless remain important and durable. Singling out the gender of a 
judge or judicial nominee tends to provoke criticism that the person in ques-
tion is a judicial activist with a policy agenda favoring select groups. The 
criticism is countered by vociferous protestations about impartiality-
protestations that are in tum interpreted by critics as mere smokescreens 
designed to obscure the reality of bias. As gender becomes a liability, sup-
porters of the judge or judicial nominee (or, in the case of Sotomayor, the 
nominee herself) increasingly deflect attention away from any direct talk 
about the importance of having a woman on the bench. 
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The end result is that the framework of current debate discourages ro-
bust advocacy of gender equity. Expressions of regret about this state of 
affairs will not make a difference so long as judicial decision making con-
tinues to be discussed only as a matter of impartial judgment or of political-
ly motivated policymaking. For lasting change to occur (as the example of 
Marx indicates 129), the basic terms of debate must be altered. 
By way of a conclusion, let me briefly suggest one strategy for usher-
ing in change, at least in the context of judicial selection. In my view, the 
critical step is to detach the call for greater gender diversity from any specif-
ic candidate for judicial office. Instead, efforts should be focused on the 
population of nominees. 130 
To raise the profile of a particular judicial nominee's gender is to put 
that person in the position of having to explain how she will overcome her 
gender. By contrast, to train attention on the gender balance of an entire 
group of nominees is to put the selection process's gatekeeper (whether that 
role is played by a merit system board, a party nominating committee, or the 
President of the United States) in the position of having to explain why 
there are not more women in the pool. The targeted criticism of gatekeepers 
will not break open the debate over judicial decision making, and public 
discussion of judges will still be dominated by concepts of impartiality and 
politically motivated policymaking. But the focused criticism of gatekeepers 
will raise a threshold question that precedes the usual dickering over indi-
vidual candidates: In a world where nearly one-half of all law students are 
women, 131 why are so few women put forward for judicial positions? 
Compared to the kind of changes Marx thought would be necessary to 
move understandings of freedom beyond the limits of individual rights, the 
strategy I am recommending can hardly be called radical. An emphasis on 
the proportion of female nominees may still be helpful because it shifts at-
tention to a debate with a more favorable structure. A number of public fig-
ures are clearly willing to spin gender as a disqualifying bias for any given 
judge, yet virtually no one is willing to argue that women are incapable of 
serving on the bench. Claims that are easy to make when the reigning oppo-
sition in the debate is between impartiality and policymaking become much 
more difficult to advance when the opposition is between modem views of 
female intellectual capacities and archaic conceptions of a woman's place. 
As a consequence, decisionmakers responsible for selecting judicial nomi-
nees lack a strong defense if they fail to name a proportionate number of 
females. Indeed, such decisionmakers not only lack a strong defense, but 
129. See supra Part I. 
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also already possess the institutional power necessary to change the gender 
mix of the nominee pool. Once we change what we talk about when we talk 
about gender imbalance on the bench, the source of the problem and the 
means of solution are both in reach. 
